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We use data on the enrollment decisions of federal annuitants to estimate the influence of
publicized ratings on health plan choice. We focus on the impact of ratings disseminated by
the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), and use our estimates to calculate the
value of the information. Our approach exploits a novel feature of the data—the availability of
nonpublic plan ratings—to correct for a source of bias that is inherent in studies of consumer
responsiveness to information on product quality: since publicized ratings are correlated with
other quality signals known to consumers (but unobserved by researchers), the estimated influ-
ence of ratings is likely to be overstated. We control for this bias by comparing the estimated
impact of publicized ratings to the estimated impact of ratings that were never disclosed. The
results indicate that NCQA’s plan ratings had a meaningful influence on individuals’ choices,
particularly for individuals choosing a plan for the first time. Although we estimate that a very
small fraction of individual decisions were materially affected by the information, for those
that were affected the implied utility gains are substantial.
1 Introduction
Consumers often choose between products whose qualities or characteristics are ex ante uncer-
tain. The reliability of a car, for example, cannot be fully known at the time of purchase, and the
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quality of a restaurant isn’t known until after one has dined there. For some products, the pres-
ence of such uncertainty has given rise to markets for information: for example, companies like
Edmunds and Consumer Reports publish automobile ratings, and publications like Zagat provide
restaurant reviews. The profitability of such information enterprises indicates that the information
is valuable—but exactly how valuable is it? In some cases, government or nonprofit consumer-
interest agencies have assumed the role of information provider. Does the information benefit
consumers enough to warrant the costs of its acquisition and dissemination?
In this paper we attempt to answer these questions in the context of employee health plan de-
cisions. For employees choosing from a menu of health plan options, how valuable are publicized
plan ratings in making the decision? The National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), an
independent nonprofit agency that serves as a “watchdog for the managed care industry,” collects
and actively disseminates information about health insurance plans. The ratings and statistics are
used by large employers to inform their employees about plans, and for a period of time in the late
1990’s summaries of the ratings were published in a major national news magazine, U.S. News &
World Report. Using enrollment data for a large sample of U.S. government annuitants, we mea-
sure the impact of the health plan ratings on individuals’ choices, and use our estimates to calculate
the value (to consumers) of the information.
This study is not the first to analyze consumer reponses to health plan quality information.
Wedig and Tai-Seale (2002) examine data on federal employees in 1995 and 1996, when health
plan report cards were first provided, and report evidence that plan ratings significantly influenced
individuals’ decisions. Beaulieu (2002) examined the health plan choices of Harvard University
employees and found that the provision of quality information in 1997 had a small but significant
effect. Scanlon et al (2002) use employee data from General Motors to study health plan decisions;
they find that employees respond to overall quality indices but not to specific quality measures.
Using the same dataset, Chernew et al (2004) estimate the parameters of a Bayesian learning
model, in which reported plan ratings cause individuals to update their prior beliefs about plan
quality. Their findings confirm the positive value of information, but also suggest that much of the
information in reported ratings was already known.
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Relative to the previous literature, the key contribution of this paper lies in its ability to cor-
rect for an important source of bias in estimating the quantitative impact of publicized ratings. A
fundamental challenge for this study and all its predecessors is that published information may be
highly correlated with quality signals consumers can obtain through informal channels. In gen-
eral, this correlation between observed product ratings and unobserved product quality will cause
econometric estimates of the ratings’ impact to be biased. In the present context, if health plan
ratings simply mirror information about plan quality that was already known to consumers (but
not the econometrician), then high market shares for plans with high ratings could be incorrectly
interpreted as evidence that the ratings were influential. This is obviously a critical concern if
one’s objective is to determine the value of information: if the health plan ratings merely reflect
information that consumers already knew, then the ratings have no informational value at all.
Our ability to address this problem comes from a novel characteristic of the data. While most
major health plans reported information to NCQA during our sample period, not all plans elected
to allow public dissemination of their information. Essentially, plans reporting to NCQA had the
option of being “public” or “nonpublic.”1 For the years 1998-1999, we have NCQA rating data
for both types of plans. The reason this is valuable is that ratings for nonpublicly reporting plans
by definition have no causal impact on choices: individuals cannot be influenced by information
they do not have. Therefore, any measured effect of nonpublic ratings on plan choice must purely
reflect the correlation of those ratings with unobserved plan quality. If the correlation between
plan ratings and unobserved plan quality is the same whether a plan is public or nonpublic, the
difference between the estimated impacts of public vs. nonpublic ratings provides a consistent
measure of the public information’s actual influence.
This approach is similar in spirit to that of Wedig and Tai-Seale (2002), who study consecutive
years in which FEHBP provided health plan report cards to employees. In 1995 these report cards
were distributed on a limited basis, whereas in 1996 the distribution was more widespread, so
the authors compare the measured effects of the report cards in the consecutive years to test the
hypothesis that report cards provided relevant information to consumers. Hence the underlying
1See Jin (2004) for an empirical analysis that partially accounts for this disclosure decision. That paper pools “not
reporting to NCQA” and “reporting to NCQA nonpublicly” as one group of non-disclosure.
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idea—to control for the bias stemming from correlations with unmeasured quality by comparing
the effects of information that is vs. is not publicized—is the same as the one motivating our study,
with the primary difference being that we are able to make this comparison contemporaneously by
comparing the impact of public vs. nonpublic information in the same year.
Our empirical strategy not only delivers a clean estimate of the informational value of pub-
licized plan ratings, but also allows us to assess the overall importance of the correlation with
unobservables problem. Previous authors have employed various approaches to circumvent or re-
solve the problem; having replicated those approaches, we can observe whether nonpublic plan
ratings still appear to “influence” individuals’ choices. For example, Beaulieu (2002) emphasizes
estimates of the impact of plan ratings on switching behavior rather than cross-sectional results
relating plans’ market shares to their ratings, and Scanlon et al (2002) use a panel dataset to es-
timate a choice model with plan fixed effects, effectively eliminating any bias that would result
if plans’ ratings are correlated with time-invariant unobservables. Our data enable us to employ
similar controls, and then additionally compare the estimated effects of public vs. nonpublic rat-
ings. If nonpublic ratings appear to be influential after controlling for time-invariant unobserved
plan characteristics or individual enrollment history, then we could infer that such controls are
insufficient—i.e., that plan ratings are likely correlated with unobservable, time-varying determi-
nants of plan choice—and result in overstated estimates of the impact of publicized plan ratings.
In the following section we explain how health plan quality information is collected and dis-
seminated to consumers, and then describe the features of our data. Section 3 presents empirical
estimates of the influence of plan ratings. The results generally confirm that correlation of these
ratings with unobservable plan characteristics is an important problem; however, we find that con-
trolling for switching costs and time-invariant unobservables (e.g., by incorporating plan fixed
effects or lagged plan market shares) mostly corrects the bias. In section 3.4 we use the empirical
estimates to calculate the information value of publicized plan ratings. Although we estimate that
a very small fraction of individual decisions were materially affected by the information, for those
that were affected the implied utility gains are substantial. The overall implications of our findings
are discussed in the concluding section.
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2 Background & Data
2.1 How health plan ratings are constructed and publicized
NCQA programs
NCQA is the earliest and remains the most important verification agency for HMOs. Founded
in 1979 by two major managed care trade associations, NCQA claimed independence in 1990 un-
der the support of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation along with matching funds from HMOs
and purchaser contributions. NCQA offers a variety of health care quality evaluation services, in-
cluding accreditation2 and the collection, updating, and maintenence of the Health Plan Employer
Data and Information Set (HEDIS R©). HEDIS has been offered nationwide annually since August
1996. It permits HMOs to disclose their summary statistics on physician inputs and patient uti-
lization of certain procedures. (Typical examples are breast cancer screening, diabetic eye exams,
child immunization, and physician turnover rates.) These data are self-collected by HMOs and
standardized subject to NCQA specifications. Every year since 1996, NCQA has also conducted
independent consumer surveys for each participating HMO and reported satisfaction indices if it is
permitted to do so. The survey was named the NCQA Member Satisfaction Survey (MSS) before
1998 and renamed the Consumer Assessment of Health Plan Satisfaction (CAHPS R©) after 1998.
Because HEDIS measures and consumer satisfaction data appear together in media publications,
we group them as HEDIS/CAHPS.
Participation in both HEDIS and CAHPS is voluntary. Moreover, HEDIS/CAHPS participants
may allow NCQA to publicize the collected data, or instruct NCQA to keep them nonpublic.
For “public” plans, NCQA may include the plan-specific data in one comparison table and sell
it to employers (typically at a cost of $2,500-7,500 per copy), disclose the data to the media,
make the data accessible through its own website, or provide the data to consumer groups and
government agencies. For example, each year from 1996 to 1998, U.S. News & World Report
used the HEDIS/MSS data to construct a comparison chart of HMOs, and assigned an overall
rating from one to four stars. Newsweek also made a similar table in 1999. In principle, the
participation and publication decisions can be made separately for HEDIS and CAHPS. In practice,
2For a detailed description of NCQA accreditation, see Jin (2004).
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plans are more likely to report in HEDIS than in CAHPS. Participation in CAHPS is somewhat
more costly because it is survey-based, and because NCQA requires the use of a licensed survey
vendor following a strict protocol.
We define a plan to be “public” if it has an overall score in U.S. News & World Report or allows
NCQA to publicize its data in both HEDIS and CAHPS. By this definition, throughout the whole
HMO industry (with or without FEHBP contracts), 26.7% of operating HMOs participated in the
public release of HEDIS/CAHPS in 1998, accounting for 49% of HMO patients. Another 18.1%
reported nonpublic data, accounting for 29% of patients. The remaining 55.2% of HMOs (covering
22% of HMO patients) did not report to NCQA.
Because participation in the NCQA rating programs is voluntary, the decision to report pub-
licly is itself potentially informative to consumers. In section 3.2 we discuss the endogeneity of
disclosure status and how it affects our empirical analysis. Intuitively, one might expect that plans
with the highest ratings are the ones who elect to report publicly; however, we discuss below that
there are various idiosyncratic reasons why some plans choose not to report publicly, and we show
that there is considerable overlap in the distribution of plan ratings for public vs. nonpublic plans.
FEHBP Guide
Operated by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), FEHBP is the largest employer-
sponsored health benefit program in the world, offering health insurance to roughly 1.7 million
federal employees and 2.2 million annuitants (which include annuitants and employee survivors).
Every year, it renegotiates contracts with 200-400 HMOs and 13-21 non-HMOs. In selecting
plans to contract with, OPM says its most important concern is a plan’s financial stability, not its
quality ratings. The rationale for including so many plans is to allow consumers to benefit from
competition among health plans.
Strictly speaking, an “HMO” can be an HMO or a POS but cannot be both.3 For simplification,
we group all HMO/POS plans as HMOs. All non-HMOs offer both PPO and non-PPO coverages,
which are subject to different copay and coinsurance structures but in the data share the same plan
ID, premium and quality ratings. If an individual chooses a non-HMO, she does not need to choose
between PPO and non-PPO until the delivery of health services. For this reason, we refer to all
3FEHBP considers it unfair for a health plan to compete with itself.
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non-HMOs as fee-for-service (FFS) and do not differentiate between PPO and non-PPO coverages.
Every year FEHBP publishes a guidebook right before the open enrollment season, November
1 to November 30. Plan choices made in the open enrollment season are valid for the duration of
the next calendar year unless the beneficiary moves or exits the FEHBP system. The guidebook,
disseminated in both hard copy and electronically on the internet, lists premium, main benefits
(such as copays and prescription drug coverage), and some quality information for every plan.
Premium is further broken down by self and family coverages, but the other variables do not vary
by self/family. Detailed benefits are described in plan-specific brochures, available at local human
resource offices and on the FEHBP website. Because there are few FFS plans and each FFS plan
has two sets of copay and coinsurance structures for PPO and non-PPO, in the empirical analysis
we define benefit variables for HMOs only.
FEHBP has long been praised as a model program for its provision of quality information.
Its own consumer satisfaction survey was started in 1994 and the first set of survey results were
disseminated to a limited subsample of beneficiaries in the 1995 open enrollment season. From
1996 on, the survey has been repeated every year and survey results have been published in the
FEHBP guide for all beneficiaries. Unlike NCQA programs, FEHBP requires every plan with
more than 300 enrollees in the previous year, including HMOs and non-HMOs, to participate in the
FEHBP consumer survey. We focus on two measures of satisfaction: the percentage of enrollees
who report being “very satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” overall, and the percentage of enrollees
who report being satisfied with a plan’s coverage of services. These satisfaction rates, as reported
in the FEHBP guide, are plan-specific and do not vary by self/family coverage, nor by respondent
characteristics. The overall satisfaction rate is a time-consistent measure, since the survey question
to which it corresponds did not change from year to year. The reporting format for plan coverage
satisfaction changed in 1999, so in our empirical models we estimate coefficients for the coverage
variable separately by year. FEHBP does not report HEDIS/CAHPS data, but they are available
from other media reports as mentioned above.4




The principal data sources for our analysis are the health plan enrollment records of all federal
government annuitants. The complete data set, which was provided by the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM), covers roughly 1.7 million employees and 2 million annuitants across the
entire U.S. for the years 1995-2000. Current employees may be more sensitive to health plan in-
formation than annuitants, but OPM keeps employee records by working place instead of living
place. Since an individual cannot enroll in an HMO unless she resides in one of the plan’s serving
counties (at the time of enrollment), the lack of residence information makes it difficult to define
the choice set of health plans for each employee. We therefore focus the empirical analysis on an-
nuitants, for whom this data problem does not exist because their residence information is recorded
in the data. We use the term “annuitants” to include both retirees and surviving family members of
deceased federal employees.5
Most of the annuitants in the data are old enough to qualify for Medicare. However, most still
enroll in an FEHBP plan for supplementary coverage. For these individuals, Medicare serves as
the primary insurer, and FEHBP plans adjust any payments so that they supplement rather than
duplicate any Medicare benefits. Although the FEHBP plans are not Medigap plans (in the sense
that they are not one of the ten standardized Medicare supplemental policies), annuitants have little
reason to purchase Medigap policies when they can obtain similar supplemental coverage through
FEHBP at heavily subsidized rates. FEHBP brochures explicitly discourage Medicare-eligible an-
nuitants from purchasing both an FEHBP plan and a Medigap policy, since the combination of
Medicare and FEHBP provides essentially comprehensive coverage. Because the majority of an-
nuitants enroll in an FEHBP plan either for primary or supplementary coverage, publicized health
plan information is directly relevant regardless of Medicare eligibility. However, it is possible that
Medicare-eligible individuals respond to the information differently; we address this issue directly
in the analysis of section 3.3.
For each annuitant in each year, we observe the health plan chosen and type of coverage (i.e.,
5Retirees entitled to annuitized retirement benefits are also eligible for FEHBP health insurance coverage if they
were continuously enrolled in any FEHBP plan for the 5 years of service immediately prior to the start of their
retirement annuity. Survivors are eligible if the employee was enrolled in family coverage at the time of death.
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single or family),6 as well as individual characteristics such as age, income, sex, and county of
residence. Table 1 summarizes the health plans offered in the FEHBP system. Because the FEHBP
covers annuitants nationwide, there are hundreds of plans in the system—even though a given
annuitant typically selects from a menu of roughly 5-10 HMO plans (in addition to all available
FFS plans). As the table indicates, the total number of plans decreased dramatically during the
sample period, and enrollment in HMO plans increased slightly.
In a typical year, about 26.5% of annuitants do not choose any FEHBP plan. This happens
for two reasons: the annuitant is covered somewhere else outside the FEHBP system, or covered
through his/her spouse who is eligible for the FEHBP benefits as well. Because we do not observe
marital status, it is impossible to distinguish these two cases. We ignore these individuals who “opt
out,” so all empirical analyses are conditional on having chosen an FEHBP plan.
To make the data more manageable and to focus attention on the data most relevant to our
study, we narrowed the sample to 86 counties in which we observed the greatest number of public
and nonpublic plans operating simultaneously. The main justification for doing this is that counties
without publicly or nonpublicly reporting plans are essentially uninformative with respect to the
key questions of our study. Moreover, although there are many counties outside our sample that
have either public or nonpublic plans, we are most interested in observing counties where both
types of plans are available. Table 2 lists the important characteristics of the counties in our selected
sample, and compares them to the full sample. Not surprisingly, our sample is somewhat biased
toward larger counties with more offered plans. However, we note that the sample covers a broad
geographic and demographic range: every major region of the U.S. is represented, with large urban
counties such as New York, NY included along with smaller and less populated counties such as
Tuolumne, CA. A full list of the 86 selected counties is provided in the appendix.
In principle, the set of available health plans in each county can be easily reconstructed from
the individual choices. However, while health insurance coverage extends from Jan. 1 to Dec. 31,
the OPM data are based on coverage and residence information as of September 30. As a result,
6Medicare enrollment is individual-only, but Medicare-eligible annuitants may enroll in family coverage through
FEHBP. In such cases, FEHBP serves as supplemental coverage for the Medicare-eligible annuitant, and as primary
or supplemental coverage for the spouse depending on his/her Medicare eligibility.
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some individuals may have moved before September 30 but kept the same health plan. Subject to
plan portability, a plan may show up in a county (with an extremely low market share) even if it
does not serve that county. To address this contamination, we cut off the choice sets by excluding
plans with market shares below 0.5% and total enrollment less than 10. The numbers in table 2
reflect this definition of the choice sets. Overall, 126 (113) HMO plans and 8 (7) FFS plans are
represented in the data in 1998 (1999). The FFS plans offered through FEHBP are national plans,
while the HMO plans are city- or county-specific.
Data on health plan characteristics were obtained from FEHBP guidebooks for the relevant
years. Some features of health plans, such as office or prescription drug copayments, exhibit
little variation across plans. However, there is substantial variation in plan premiums. During our
sample period, the government covered 71% of the listed premium, with the remainder being the
responsibility of the enrollee. Premiums vary across plans—even within fee-for-service or HMO
classes, some plans were considerably more expensive than others—and also (to a lesser extent)
over time. The top panel of Table 3 shows summary statistics for plan characteristics, comparing
the selected sample to the full sample. The bottom panels of the table summarize the individual
characteristics of principal interest for the empirical analysis. Note that because the sample consists
solely of annuitants, the average age is quite high and the average income is rather low. Our income
measure reflects pension payments by the government, and will understate true income levels to
the extent that individuals have income from other sources.
In analyzing health plan choice behavior it is useful to distinguish two specific types of indi-
viduals: “switchers” and “new enrollees.” We define a switcher as someone who switches plans
in a given year without being compelled to do so by some change in her choice set. As indicated
in table 3, the rate of plan switching is extremely low in our sample: in a given year, fewer than
2 percent of annuitants voluntarily switch to a different plan. In spite of how few they are in
number, the switchers are very important in the empirical analysis: the impact of information on
plan choice is identified partly from the prevalence of switching toward higher-rated plans. Table 4
shows some switching patterns in our sample, indicating that switches tend to be toward plans with
higher satisfaction rates and higher NCQA scores. The bottom panel of the table shows similar pat-
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terns for “new enrollees.” Unlike switchers, who change plans without being compelled to do so,
new enrollees are annuitants whose circumstances essentially force them to select a new plan. The
main cause for this in our data is a move: if an annuitant moves to a new county that is not served
by her current health plan, she must choose a new plan from the set of available options in the
new county. Additionally, in a small number of cases an annuitant’s previous plan was dropped
from the FEHBP system, so the annuitant was required to select a new plan; these individuals are
also coded as new for the respective year. Together, these new enrollees account for 6% of the
sample. Given the low incidence of plan switching, new individuals’ choices are perhaps the most
informative observations in the data for estimating the impact of plan characteristics and published
information.
It is worth noting that the low switching rate is not unique to our data. Among the Harvard
employees studied in Beaulieu (2002), only 5% voluntarily switched plans in 1997, and another
4% were forced to switch due to plan termination. The voluntary switch rates reported by Sorensen
(2004) are also in the 5% range (for employees of the University of California). These percentages
are not far from ours, and given the size of our sample, we observe a much greater number of
voluntary and involuntary switches.
For the empirical analysis, we restrict our attention to the years 1998-1999. Health plan ratings
based on HEDIS/CAHPS data were not widely available until 1997: although some information
was being collected by NCQA, that information was not actively disseminated until late 1996.
In September 1996, U.S. News & World Report released an issue devoted to health plan quality
concerns, including a summary of the NCQA ratings for all publicly reporting U.S. health plans.
This special issue was then repeated annually for the years 1997-1998. Due to the late publication
dates, the ratings are relevant to the enrollment decisions for the following year, so 1997 was the
first year in which annuitants’ plan choices could have been influenced by the published ratings.
However, we are forced to ignore 1997 in the analysis because we do not have complete data from
NCQA on health plan scores for 1997. Although in principle U.S. News scores could be used
to impute the NCQA information (a process explained in more detail below), the imputation is
problematic for 1997, since the weighting of various NCQA categories was dramatically different
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in 1997 vs. 1998-1999 (the years for which we do have complete NCQA data). This essentially
makes it difficult to calculate summary ratings that are comparable across years.7
The critical variables in this study are the public and nonpublic NCQA plan ratings. As men-
tioned in the previous section, NCQA collects health plan information in many categories as part of
its HEDIS/CAHPS system. In order to summarize the various scores into a single composite rating,
we make use of the ratings published by U.S. News. These ratings were probably the highest-profile
publication of NCQA information, and they are convenient as summary measures of plan quality.
However, the rating system differed slightly for 1998 vs. 1999, and the exact algorithm used to
compute the summary scores was not available to us. We handle the first of these complications
by standardizing the scores (subtracting the mean score and dividing by the standard deviation of
scores for each year). For public plans, then, our NCQA score variable is simply the standardized
U.S. News score: it reflects the number of standard deviations above or below the mean score in
that year. For nonpublic plans, we impute the score variable using the estimated relationship be-
tween observed U.S. News ratings and NCQA scores. That is, we regress the U.S. News scores for
public plans on all 39 NCQA variables (with another 39 dummies to indicate if the data for those
variables were missing), and use the estimated coefficients to predict the (standardized) scores that
the nonpublic plans would have received had they been published in U.S. News.8 The regressions
were run separately for 1998 and 1999 since we were told that U.S. News had changed the relative
weights of the NCQA categories in their calculation. Although this imputation procedure is not
perfect, we are confident that the resulting score variable is internally consistent (i.e., comparable
across years and across public vs. nonpublic status). The correlation between the imputed NCQA
scores and the FEHBP satisfaction index is 0.43, suggesting that while both measures tend to iden-
tify similar plans as being good ones, they are not redundant (i.e., there is information content in
7The 1997 U.S. News ratings weighted preventive care categories much more heavily than in later years. In fact, the
1997 ratings were based solely on preventive measures, while 1998 and 1999 ratings included many non-preventive
categories such as access to care, access to doctor, doctor credentials, and member satisfaction. When we tried im-
puting the 1997 scores and incorporating them in our analysis, our findings were consistent with this: annuitants, who
are probably less concerned about preventive care than other populations, appeared to respond negatively to high U.S.
News ratings. When we broke down overall U.S. News ratings into specific preventive measures, we found annui-
tants responding positively to cholestrol check, pap test and mammography, but negatively to child immunization and
prenatal care.
8The R2 for the prediction equation was .92 for 1998 and .91 for 1999.
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both measures).
3 Empirical Model & Results
3.1 Model
Our objective is to measure individuals’ responsiveness to publicized health plan ratings, and to
use the resulting estimates to calculate the value of the information. We model consumers’ health
plan decisions in a traditional discrete choice framework, with expected plan utilities depending
explicitly on the information available. In particular, we suppose that individuals’ perceived pay-
offs from choosing each plan depend on a set of plan and individual characteristics, x, a set of
information variables (quality signals), z, and an unobserved plan characteristic, w. (We will
interpret w specifically as a quality signal that is observed by consumers but not by the econome-
trician.) In the application, x consists of plan characteristics such as premium, type (fee-for-service
or HMO), emergency room and prescription drug copayments, etc., and interactions with individ-
ual characeristics such as age, income, and sex. The key information variables (z) in our study
are the satisfaction index (from the FEHBP guidebook) and the NCQA scores (as described in
section 2.2).
We assume that an individual’s indirect utility from choosing a plan is a linear function of plan
characteristics and plan quality, which we denote q, plus an idiosyncratic error. Of course, plan
quality is uncertain at the time of enrollment, so individual i forms expectations about q using
quality signals. Letting uijt(Ωijt) denote individual i’s expected utility from choosing plan j in
period t when the information available about plan j is Ωijt, we have
uijt(Ωijt) = xijtβ + Ei[qjt] + εijt .
We consider two information sets: Ω0ijt = {xjt, wijt} when plan ratings are not available to
the public, and Ω1ijt = {xjt, zjt, wijt} when plan ratings get publicized. We also assume that the
conditional expectation function for q is linear, so that:
Ei[qjt|xjt, wijt] = xjtδ0 + wijtθ0
13
and
Ei[qjt|xjt, zjt, wijt] = xjtδ1 + zjtγ1 + wijtθ1 .
Expected plan utilities are then given by
uijt(Ω
0




ijt) = xijt(β + δ1) + zjtγ1 + wijtθ1 + εijt (2)
The above expressions for plan utilities highlight two important difficulties in measuring con-
sumers’ responsiveness to information. First, since observable information variables are likely to
be correlated with unobserved signals of plan quality, coefficients on those information variables
will typically misrepresent the true impact of the information. In the present context, where the
z’s are health plan ratings, we are concerned that γ̂1 will reflect more than just the impact of those
ratings on consumers’ choices: it will also reflect any correlation of plan ratings with unobserved
plan quality. In the worst case, the plan ratings may simply serve as perfect proxies for w, so that
even though they have no informational value they will be estimated to have a positive impact on
consumers’ choices. The second difficulty can be seen in the comparison of equations 1 and 2:
when new information becomes available, other factors that were used in forming expectations
about plan quality will be weighted differently. In other words, the coefficients on other variables
are likely to change when z (the new information) is made available to consumers. For example,
in the absence of published health plan ratings, consumers may rely on plan premiums as signals
of quality. In that case, we would expect the estimated coefficient on premium to be different
depending on whether the ratings were available.
The availability of nonpublic information in our data allows us to address these issues directly.
To see the first point, let us ignore the second problem for the moment. If publicizing plan ratings
does not entail changes in the other coefficients, γ should capture the full value of information
and the only bias in γ̂ arises from the correlation between plan ratings z and unobserved quality
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signals w. Our data allow us to use the undisclosed health plan ratings to directly correct this bias.
Because nonpublic plans’ ratings were undisclosed, they have no direct impact on consumers’
choices: i.e., the coefficient on nonpublic plan scores must be zero in the choice model. Therefore,
if we include nonpublic plan scores in the empirical model, then the estimated coefficient reflects
only the correlation of those scores with unobserved quality. If we also assume that the correlation
of plan scores with unobserved plan quality is the same regardless of whether the scores were
made public or not, then the difference between the coefficients for public vs. non-public plan
scores identifies the direct impact of the information.
If publicizing plan ratings leads consumers to reweight other quality signals, the above logic
must be modified. The change in perceived plan utilities resulting from new information is obtained
by differencing equations 1 and 2:
uijt(Ω
1
ijt) − uijt(Ω0ijt) = xijt(δ1 − δ0) + zjtγ1 + wijt(θ1 − θ0). (3)
This expression suggests that γ1 is not the only parameter of interest: introducing new information
changes the weights on other quality signals, and this indirect effect should be taken into account
in computing the value of the information. For the x variables we can address this issue directly, by
allowing their coefficients to differ across information regimes (i.e., public vs. nonpublic plans);
however, since wijt is unobserved, we cannot directly measure changes in its impact on perceived
utilities. In what follows, we report results from estimating the model under the assumption that
δ0 = δ1 and θ0 = θ1, and also consider specifications in which δ0 and δ1 are estimated separately.
If these assumptions are wrong, our estimate of γ1 will reflect a combination of the pure impact
of the information and changes in the influences of other quality signals. However, while this
suggests a bias in γ̂1 in the technical sense, it is arguably advantageous for calculating the value
of information: to the extent possible, we want our calculations to incorporate all the changes in
consumers’ choices that result from the new information.
The public-nonpublic comparison we propose above is complementary to various empirical
strategies utilized in the existing literature. When data from multiple time periods are available,
one approach is to assume that unobserved quality is time-invariant and common to all individuals
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(i.e., wijt = wj). In that case, the wj’s can be estimated as fixed effects. This is a way of controlling
for unobserved plan quality, and it is essentially the approach adopted by Chernew et al (2004).
However, if in fact there are time- or individual-specific quality signals observed by consumers but
not by econometricians—i.e., wijt = wj + ηijt—then the endogeneity problem is still present to
the extent that scorejt is correlated with the specific quality signal ηijt.
Another approach to control for unobserved quality signals is to directly account for individual
specific enrollment history. For example, Beaulieu (2002) estimates plan choice (and the probabil-
ity of switching) as a function of the number of years an individual has been enrolled in a specific
plan. This allows each individual to have better knowledge about the plan she chose before, but
still assumes that the unobserved quality signal is orthogonal to observed plan ratings for all the
plans she did not choose. Apparently, this approach is complementary to the fixed-effects one:
enrollment history controls for individual- and time-specific knowledge of plan quality, while plan
fixed effects control for time-invariant information that is common to every individual.
Because our data include multiple years and some nonpublic scores, we are able to augment the
previous approaches with the public-nonpublic comparison outlined above. Rather than estimate
fixed effects, however, we instead consider specifications in which each plan’s market share from
the previous year is included as a control for wj. Lagged market shares essentially absorb the unob-
served heterogeneity in the same way fixed effects would, while still allowing for some movement
in unobserved plan quality over time.9 More importantly, the public-nonpublic comparison allows
us to assess how effectively the existing approaches address the problem of unobserved quality
signals: if nonpublic ratings still appear to have a significant impact after we include a specific
control, then that control must not fully correct the bias from the unobservables.
3.2 Endogeneity of Disclosure Decisions
A potential concern with our empirical analysis is that health plans’ disclosure decisions are en-
dogenous. Participation in the NCQA rating programs is voluntary, so plans choose whether to
report and, conditional on reporting, whether to allow the information to be publicized. Plans that
9In what follows we report results from specifications with lagged market shares included as controls; specifications
with plan fixed effects yielded qualitatively and quantitatively similar results.
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elect not to report to NCQA apparently do so either because it is too costly to construct data in
compliance with NCQA specifications or because they face little market pressure to do so. Also,
some plans do not meet minimum size requirements for reporting clinical indicators. Some plans
capitate most doctors and it is difficult to synchronize different databases kept in each individual
doctor’s office. In the October 13, 1997 issue of U.S. News, the editor wrote “Don’t assume that
(an HMO not listed in the comparison table) is a subpar performer. Many managed-care plans
in this fast-changing sector are being absorbed into others or are in the process of restructuring
themselves, and yours simply may be too new to have the several years’ worth of data required
for listing. Others lack the information-gathering abilities to collect vast quantities of data. And
HMOs with minimal competition may feel little pressure to generate numbers if local employers
do not ask for them.”
It is more puzzling why a plan would report its data to NCQA but choose to keep the data
nonpublic. One reason cited by NCQA staff is concerns about heterogeneous auditing practices.
Although NCQA required submitted data to be audited by a third party beginning in 1998, prior to
that many HMOs submitted unaudited data. Some plans felt it was unfair for their audited data to
be compared with others’ unaudited data, but still wanted their numbers to enter in the calculation
of national averages, since the latter may be used in shaping future public policies for the managed
care industry.
However, this does not explain why nonpublic reporting still exists after 1998. Economic the-
ory suggests that zero-cost disclosure should be 100% unraveling: as long as consumers assume
non-disclosing firms have the worst quality, every firm above the worst quality has an incentive
to disclose, and therefore disclosure and non-disclosure are equally revealing for the worst ones.10
We suspect the unraveling theory fails in the context of health plans because consumers do not nec-
essarily know what the worst quality is. Obviously, if the data turn out to be worse than consumer
beliefs, the plan may choose to hide the data. Another possibility is that plans may not believe
NCQA specifications provide an unbiased description of HMO quality. For example, some plans
are good in dental and vision care, but NCQA measures do not capture this competitive advan-
tage. Reporting in the publicized dataset may mislead consumers to cherry-pick plans that are only
10See, e.g., Milgrom (1981), Grossman (1981), and Jovanovic (1982).
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strong in dimensions reported by NCQA.
Although modeling plans’ disclosure decisions is beyond the scope of this paper, we address the
issue indirectly by including an indicator for publicly reporting plans as a covariate in the empirical
models we estimate below. To the extent that a plan’s reporting status is informative about its
quality, consumers’ mean response to that information should be captured in the coefficient on this
dummy variable.
Given the empirical strategy of the paper—to compare the estimated impacts on consumer deci-
sions of public vs. nonpublic ratings—it is important that there be some overlap in the distributions
of scores for public and nonpublic plans. Implicitly, our analysis asks what the market shares of
nonpublic plans would have been if their scores had been public. But we intuitively expect non-
public plans to have lower scores than public plans—since low-scoring plans are precisely the ones
with an incentive to withhold the information—and comparisons of nonpublic plans with public
plans would be difficult if the former were of uniformly lower quality. However, as mentioned
above, there are other idiosyncratic reasons why plans might elect to be nonpublic, and in fact we
find that many nonpublic plans have relatively high ratings. Figure 1 shows the score distributions
for public and nonpublic plans, both for the full sample and for the selected sample. As expected,
public plans clearly have higher average scores, but the overlap in the distributions is still sub-
stantial. This overlap suggests (and our conversations with researchers at NCQA have tended to
confirm) that plans’ reasons for selecting nonpublic status are often somewhat idiosyncratic, and
not merely a function of plan quality.
An additional concern is that the endogeneity of plans’ disclosure decisions may undermine
our assumption that the correlation between NCQA scores and unobserved quality signals is the
same for public and nonpublic plans. However, we see no reason that endogenous selection of
public vs. nonpublic plans would imply differences in this correlation. Suppose, for example, that
plans choose to allow public disclosure if their ratings are better than the quality signal observed by
consumers. Although this would truncate the distribution of ratings that consumers get to observe,
it would not necessarily induce a difference in the correlation between ratings and quality signals
for public vs. nonpublic plans.
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3.3 Estimation & Results
We estimate the choice model in equations (1) and (2) assuming the distribution of the errors, ε ijt,
is type I extreme value, so that the choice probabilities have the convenient logit form. Our x
variables include plan premium (interacted with age, sex, and income), a fee-for-service indicator
(also interacted with age, sex, and income), and copays for outpatient visits, emergency room
visits, and prescription drugs (separately for branded and generic).11 Summary statistics for these
variables are reported in Table 3. Our information variables, z, are the satisfaction index from
the FEHBP guidebook and the NCQA plan score.12 As described in section 2.2, the fraction of
individuals switching plans in a given year is typically quite low. To accommodate this feature of
the data, we include an additional covariate to represent switching costs. In particular, we define
an indicator switchijt = 1 if individual i did not choose plan j in period t − 1. In other words, in
any given period, this indicator is turned on for every plan except the one chosen last period.
Table 5 reports maximum likelihood estimates for four specifications of the model.13 Each of
the four columns in the table represents different sets of controls, to facilitate comparisons of the
corresponding estimates of plan ratings’ impact. The first column controls for neither switching
costs nor lagged market shares; essentially, it estimates the impact of plan ratings purely from the
cross-sectional patterns in market shares. The second and third columns control for switching costs
and lagged market shares (respectively), and the fourth column—our preferred specification—
controls for both.
The estimated coefficients on plan characteristics are mostly consistent with basic intuition
about health plan choice.14 The coefficient on premium is negative and statistically significant, and
11Some additional variables are included in the estimated models to serve as controls, but not reported in the tables
in order to save space. These include indicators for type of coverage (self or family), Medicare eligibility, NCQA
accreditation status, and dummy variables to indicate whether the values of certain variables were missing.
12The NCQA scores apply only to HMO plans. For FFS plans, we set the scores to zero and include an FFS dummy
to control for the “missing” scores.
13The large size of our sample makes the model computationally burdensome to estimate. To reduce the burden,
we randomly sampled non-new and non-switching enrollees for inclusion in the estimation: the sample used for
estimation includes all new enrollees, all enrollees who switch plans, and a random 5% sample of all other enrollees.
The observations are then weighted so that the estimated coefficients accurately reflect the effects that would be
obtained from the full sample.
14Several plan characteristics are included in the model as controls but omitted from the table to save space. These
include HMO age, model type, an indicator for whether the HMO belongs to a national managed care chain, the
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it differs meaningfully depending on individual characteristics: e.g., price sensitivity decreases
with income. The large negative coefficient on the switch indicator reflects the persistence of
health plan enrollment decisions: people very rarely switch away from their chosen plan. Females
are less likely to switch plans than males, and switching is more likely among younger annuitants
with higher incomes.15 The importance of allowing for this inertia is evident from the dramatic
improvement in fit when the switch indicators are included (the pseudo-R2 increases from 0.18 to
over 0.90). The coefficients on both the switch variables and the lagged market shares reflect a
general persistence in plans’ market shares, which could result from reluctance to switch plans at
the individual level, or from small net changes in enrollment shares in spite of high turnover at the
individual level. Including the switch variables in the model allows the data to distinguish these
two explanations (in favor of the former), and also yields more reliable estimates of the premium
coefficients.
In general, the coefficients on the information variables are sensible, indicating that annuitants
prefer plans with higher published ratings. However, the important pattern shown in the tables is
that the magnitudes of the coefficients shrink when switching costs and lagged market shares are
included as controls. This is especially true for the satisfaction rate. The pattern is suggestive of
the central concern this paper addresses: that reported plan ratings are correlated with unobserved
plan quality. Note that if the impact of plan ratings is estimated purely from the cross-section
(column I), the estimate is quite large with a very small standard error. However, it is clear from
table 5 that much of this estimated effect must be spurious: the coefficient on nonpublic NCQA
scores is also large and statistically significant, which would imply that individuals were affected
by information they never received. Our ability to observe “responsiveness” to ratings that were
never disclosed allows us to assess the effectiveness of various controls at mitigating the bias. The
estimates reported in column IV of table 5 suggest that switch costs and lagged market shares help
control for unobserved plan quality, as the coefficient on nonpublic scores is closer to zero. This is
number of hospitals under contract with the HMO, and the number of physicians under contract with the HMO.
15Note that although it is tempting to convert the switch coefficient to dollars (using the premium coefficient) and
interpret it as a literal switching cost, this would ignore other plausible explanations for the observed inertia. For
instance, the negative coefficient could reflect persistence in preferences: consumers tend to stay in the same plan not
because it is costly to switch, but because their idiosyncratic preferences for plans are highly stable over time (e.g., the
εijt’s could be serially correlated).
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somewhat encouraging, since in general it is easier to obtain panel data and control for plan effects
than it is to obtain nonpublic data. However, it appears that neither control is sufficient to entirely
resolve the problematic correlation between published information and unobserved quality.
The positive difference in the estimated coefficients for public vs. nonpublic plan ratings reveals
clearly that published ratings indeed contain information that is acted upon. If these coefficients
were equal, we would be forced to conclude that published scores contained no new information—
i.e., they simply mirrored information that was already known. However, the estimated difference
is statistically and economically significant. If interpreted literally as the causal effect of the rat-
ings on perceived plan qualities, the difference in the public vs. nonpublic coefficients (0.292 in
the preferred specification in column IV) is large enough to suggest the published scores have a
meaningful impact on choice: if a plan’s score increased by one standard deviation, this would in-
crease a typical individual’s likelihood of choosing that plan by 2.63 percentage points. To put this
in context, an equivalent increase in the likelihood of selection would result from a $759 decrease
in the annual gross premium (which would mean $220 less per year out of the annuitant’s pocket).
The quantitative estimates of individuals’ responsiveness to information will figure prominently in
the analysis of section 3.4, where we use the results to compute the dollar value of the information.
Table 6 presents estimates of the choice model based on two divisions of the sample. The first
two columns compare the results for Medicare-eligible vs. non-Medicare-eligible individuals. As
mentioned above, Medicare-eligible annuitants purchase FEHBP plans as supplemental coverage,
and therefore may respond differently to published information than individuals for whom the
FEHBP plan is the primary insurer. However, the results indicate that choice behavior is quite
similar between the two groups. Medicare-eligible annuitants are more price-sensitive and less
responsive to NCQA ratings, but the differences are small. This is encouraging, since it suggests
that our findings aren’t peculiar to the Medicare subpopulation.
Perhaps the most informative comparison afforded by the data is that of “old” vs. “new” en-
rollees. As is evident from the estimated coefficients on the switch indicator, annuitants tend to
choose a plan and then stick with it. The choices of individuals who were already enrolled in a
certain plan are in a way less informative than the choices of “new” individuals whose circum-
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stances required a fresh decision. Given that the new annuitants we identify are primarily those
moving to a new county (with a different set of available health plans), we expect them to have
less prior information about the options, and to therefore be more responsive to published ratings.
Columns III and IV of Table 6 present estimates of the choice model separately for new vs. old
enrollees. As expected, individuals making new decisions appear to be much more sensitive to
published information about plan quality. For annuitants who had the option of simply staying in
their previous plan, the difference between the coefficients on public vs. nonpublic scores is in fact
slightly negative (though the difference is not statistically significant). For new enrollees, on the
other hand, the difference is large: a one standard-deviation increase in a public plan’s score would
increase its probability of selection by approximately 3.89 percentage points for an individual with
mean characteristics.
As suggested in section 3.1, it is potentially important to allow the coefficients on the x vari-
ables to differ depending on whether the information variables were available. In principle, in-
dividuals forming expectations about plan quality should weight plan characteristics differently
for public vs. nonpublic plans. To account for this possibility, we estimated the model allowing
the coefficients on the x variables to be different for public vs. nonpublic plans. As discussed
in section 3.1, this gives us some explicit idea about how consumers reweight the observable x’s
as quality signals. Table 7 reports results from this alternative specification. The estimated co-
efficients on the NCQA score variables are very similar to those reported in Tables 5 and 6, but
some of the x-interactions are significant. One notable difference is that individuals appear to be
more price-sensitive for public plans, which is consistent with the idea that premiums could be
used as signals of quality in the absence of other direct information about quality. (For nonpublic
plans, higher premiums might be taken to imply higher quality, which would tend to make demand
appear price-inelastic.) Individuals also appear to be less responsive to lagged market shares for
public plans, and less averse to switching to public plans, which again could be taken to imply that
plan information from alternative channels is relied on more heavily when publicized ratings are
unavailable. However, the coefficients on the Coverage×Public interactions are an exception to
this pattern: individuals appear to be more responsive to coverage ratings for public plans than for
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nonpublic plans.
Collectively, the results in tables 5-7 tell a plausible story about consumer choice behavior and
responsiveness to information, and the pattern of coefficients on the public and nonpublic NCQA
scores is fairly robust. Several additional controls were included in the estimation but omitted from
the tables to save space; in general the coefficients on these controls are consistent with intuition,
but a few of the coefficients have unexpected signs. For example, the coefficient on a plan’s copay
rate for branded drugs is positive,16 which could mean that higher copays for branded drugs are
correlated with more generous formularies (about which our data have no information). Because
these few anomalous coefficients suggested we may have some important omitted variables, we
re-estimated the models to see if omitting different sets of plan characteristics would have an
appreciable impact on our main results. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar,
though the coefficients on the NCQA score variables change slightly when copay variables and/or
contracting variables are omitted.17 We prefer the reported specification because copays are clearly
printed in the FEHBP brochures and contracting variables were found to be important in numerous
previous studies; including these variables as controls should capture (to the extent our data allow)
the other information that enrollees observe beyond the NCQA scores.
One potential concern with our empirical results is that premiums may be endogenous in the
sense of being correlated with unobserved plan quality. This is a classic problem with price coeffi-
cients in discrete choice models, and generally tends to bias the estimates toward finding relatively
inelastic demand. This is very important in our case, since in order to calculate a meaningful esti-
mate of the value of information, we need to use the estimated price coefficient to convert numbers
to dollars. If our estimate of individuals’ price sensitivity is too close to zero (too inelastic), when
we divide by it we will get an upward-biased estimate of the dollar value of information.
The magnitudes of the premium coefficients indeed suggest that annuitants are not very sen-
sitive to price. For example, for a plan with a market share of 10%, a $300 increase in the gross
annual premium would reduce its probability of selection by only 1.04 percentage points for a
16We also control for the copay of generic drugs. Its coefficient is negative, as expected.
17The coefficient on the public NCQA scores increases slightly, and the coefficient on the non-public NCQA scores
tends to decrease slightly when omitting observable plan characteristics. Details of these sensitivity tests (along with
tables listing the full sets of estimated coefficients) are available from the authors.
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typical annuitant (based on the estimates in column IV of table 5). This relative unresponsiveness
to price is due in part to employer cost-sharing—the $300 increase in gross premium requires only
$100 in additional payments by the enrollee—but we note that it may reflect the endogeneity prob-
lem described above. Nevertheless, controlling for lagged market share should alleviate much of
the problem: any bias that remains must reflect correlation between premiums and period-specific
quality shocks. Also, comparisons with findings from other studies are reassuring. Wedig and
Tai-Seale (2002) estimate price sensitivities very close to ours (based on the specifications in col-
umn IV of Table 5 or column I of Table 7), and the estimates of Chernew et al (2004) are actually
smaller (implying even less price sensitivity than what we find).
3.4 Calculating the value of information
The estimates reported in tables 5-7 can be used to derive the value to consumers of the NCQA
scores. Changing notation slightly from the previous section, let u i(j) denote individual i’s indirect
utility from plan j. If ai is the plan that individual i would choose if the information is available,
and bi the plan that would be chosen in the absence of the information, then the dollar value of the
information to individual i is [ui(ai)−ui(bi)]/αi, where αi is the marginal utility of a dollar. Under
this definition, information is valueless (ex post) if it doesn’t change the individual’s choice—i.e.,
if ai = bi. Note that in principle one could allow the utility function itself to change depending
on the information available, in which case the information could have value even if ai = bi. For
example, people could derive utility from being told that their chosen plan is highly rated even if
that information would not have affected their choice. In what follows, we instead choose to hold
the utility function fixed, and calculate the ex post value of information by determining (a) whether
the information affected the individual’s choice and (b) if so, what the resulting gain in utility was.
To generate numerical estimates of the value of information, we consider two counterfactual
experiments. First, we ask how utility would have been affected if the public NCQA scores had
been nonpublic—i.e., we compare the actual information regime to one with no publicized infor-
mation at all. Second, we ask how utility would have changed if the nonpublic NCQA scores had






where ûi is the estimated utility function from the “informed” regime, α̂i is the estimated marginal
utility of a dollar for individual i,18 and âi (b̂i) is the model’s prediction of individual i’s choice
with (without) information. To be specific, we obtain estimates from the following simulation
procedure: (1) calculate plan utilities for each individual under each regime (with vs. without
information), using random draws from the extreme value distribution for the ε’s; (2) obtain â i
(b̂i) by determining which plan yields the maximal predicted utility in the informed (uninformed)
model; (3) calculate the difference in utilities from âi and b̂i using the utility function from the
informed regime; (4) divide that difference by α̂i to convert the number to dollars per year.19
Table 8 shows average estimates from 100 replications of the above simulation procedure.
Based on the specification in column I of table 7, we estimate that the choices of 3,539 individuals
were directly affected by the publicized NCQA scores, in the sense that they would have chosen a
different plan if they hadn’t had the information. However, this is a very small percentage of the
total: 99.3% of the enrollment choices in our sample would have been the same with or without the
information. This is primarily due to the considerable inertia in health plan enrollment decisions:
for the vast majority of individuals, the switching costs swamp any effect the information might
have. For those individuals whose decisions were materially affected by the ratings, the value of
the information is estimated to be substantial: $160 per person per year. Averaged over all indi-
viduals in the sample, the value of the published scores is only $1.11 per person. Interestingly,
the second column of the table indicates that publicizing the nonpublic scores (the second coun-
terfactual experiment) would have had a slightly lower informational value, presumably because
nonpublic plans tend to have lower market shares than public plans and there are fewer nonpublic
plans overall.
The relatively small fraction of decisions for which the ratings are pivotal suggests separating
the estimates for new vs. old individuals: the choices of annuitants whose circumstances necessitate
18This varies across individuals because the coefficient on premium in the choice model depends on the individual’s
age, sex, and income.
19In this case, α̂i is obtained as (coefficient on premium for i)×26×0.29, since payments are biweekly and the
annuitants’ share of the cost is 29 percent.
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a new health plan decision are presumably more sensitive to the ratings, and we should therefore
expect the information to be more valuable to them. The second panel of table 8 presents calculated
values based on separately estimated models for old and new annuitants. The value of publicized
NCQA scores is clearly smaller for individuals who have the option of maintaining enrollment in
their previous plan: less than half of one percent of these individuals are estimated to have made
different choices than they would have in the absence of the publicized information. In contrast, the
information appears to be much more influential for individuals making new choices: over 8% of
these annuitants were affected by the publicized ratings, and the average value of the information
among those whose choices “changed” was $588.67 (and $47.31 among all new enrollees). Since
new enrollees comprise roughly 6.2% of the sample, our estimate of the overall average value of
the information for the entire sample is (47.31)(0.062)+(0.49)(0.938)=$3.39 per person per year.20
These estimates can be used to make a rough calculation of the overall gain in consumer wel-
fare derived from the information provided by NCQA. Multiplied by the 1.7 million individuals in
the full sample who chose an FEHBP plan, the $3.39 per person implies a $5.76 million overall
benefit per year to annuitants of the U.S. government. This number is likely to overstate the true
benefit, however, since plans with publicized ratings are less prevalent in general than in the spe-
cific subsample we selected for the analysis. However, even if there were no benefits whatsoever to
individuals outside the selected sample, the estimated overall benefit to those 250,000 individuals
who are in the sample would be $0.85 million per year.
Dynamic considerations also suggest these numbers may understate the true value of informa-
tion. We calculate the expected dollar value for a given year, but the effects of information are
not confined to the current period: costs of bad choices continue over each additional period in
which the incorrect choice persists. Also, switching costs are incurred when an individual ulti-
mately switches out of a bad choice. This suggests that the present value of information should
incorporate not just the benefits of correct choices in the current year, but also the implicit benefits
in future years of avoiding the costs associated with bad choices.
20In order to put a confidence interval around this number, we performed a parametric bootstrap procedure in
which we resampled the parameter vector from the distribution implied by our estimates, and recalculated (using the
simulation method described above) the value of information number for each resampled value of the parameter. Using
30 repetitions we get a 95% confidence interval of [$3.14,$3.64].
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4 Discussion and conclusions
Our empirical results clearly indicate that publicized ratings have a direct impact on individuals’
choices of health plans—a finding that is consistent with other recent studies of information and
health plan choice. More importantly, our ability to compare the effects of publicized and non-
publicized plan ratings allows us to assess the significance of a potential source of bias: if publi-
cized ratings largely reflect information that is already known to consumers (but not econometricians)—
that is, if ratings are correlated with unobserved plan quality—then naive estimators will overstate
the actual impact of the information. Not surprisingly, this problem is most severe when the effect
of information variables is estimated from a simple cross-section: in that case, even information
that was unavailable to consumers appears to have had a substantial impact.
We suspect nonpublic data will rarely be accessible to researchers, so comparisons like the
ones made here will not typically be feasible. Nevertheless, our findings about the effectiveness of
various control methods are somewhat encouraging. In particular, using panel data and incorporat-
ing plan fixed effects or lagged market shares appears to be helpful: in our application, including
lagged market shares and controlling for switching costs eliminate some (but not all) of the bias.
Our estimates imply the average dollar value of the publicized plan information is modest
($3.39 per person per year when averaged over all individuals in our sample), but the value is
much more substantial for the small fraction of individuals whose decisions are affected by the
information. In any case, even this seemingly modest estimate implies benefits that far outweigh
the costs of acquiring and distributing the information. If the $3.39 per household is crudely
extrapolated to every U.S. household enrolled in a health plan, we would arrive at a total benefit
easily exceeding $200 million per year. Though such a number is obviously speculative, it seems
clear that the overall benefits to consumers far outweigh the costs. (NCQA’s annual operating
expenses were roughly $20 million for the period we studied, and only a fraction of those expenses
were related to the HEDIS and CAHPS programs.)
Note also that the benefits we have calculated are the direct benefits to consumers; we have
made no attempt to estimate the indirect benefits that may accrue from health plans’ increased
incentives to provide quality. If active publication of health plan quality reports causes plans to
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improve their services and obtain better health outcomes, the consequent benefits to consumers
could conceivably swamp the benefits we’ve estimated here. Analyzing health plans’ responses to
the publication of information is a difficult but important issue to explore.21
Finally, our results suggest open questions about the format in which information is delivered to
consumers. Would the impact of the publicized plan ratings be greater if the ratings were reported
differently? How much more influential is the information if it is delivered directly to consumers
in a brochure instead of indirectly via news publications or the internet? Also, for which categories
of care does information about plan quality appear to be highly valued? Our findings confirm that
quality information is valued by consumers in a general sense, leaving these (and other) questions
about the nuances of publicizing quality ratings for future research.
21Jin (2004) is one example of a paper that focuses on supply-side responses to the provision of information.
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Appendix A: Counties in selected sample
County # annuitants County # annuitants
Alameda CA 10479 Merced CA 681
Albany NY 1936 Montgomery NY 301
Allegheny PA 8093 Nash NC 305
Amador CA 318 Nassau NY 5480
Ashtabula OH 256 Nevada CA 755
Beaver PA 518 New York NY 3776
Boulder CO 1652 Nye NV 427
Bronx NY 4046 Orange CA 7051
Butler OH 613 Orange NY 1762
Butler PA 817 Parker TX 472
Butte CA 1283 Putnam NY 264
Calaveras CA 346 Queens NY 8471
Cape May NJ 943 Rensselaer NY 1093
Cattaraugus NY 227 Riverside CA 5413
Chautauqua NY 362 Robeson NC 369
Clark NV 7879 Rockland NY 774
Cook IL 19084 Sacramento CA 14512
Cowlitz WA 352 San Bernardino CA 6842
Cumberland NJ 282 San Diego CA 18188
Cumberland PA 4214 San Francisco CA 5147
Custer CO 29 San Mateo CA 3943
Denver CO 4875 Santa Clara CA 4629
El Paso CO 4319 Santa Cruz CA 676
Essex NY 176 Saratoga NY 916
Fremont CO 467 Schenectady NY 1052
Genesee NY 270 Schoharie NY 107
Gloucester NJ 1659 Sonoma CA 2704
Graham AZ 166 Stanislaus CA 1374
Greene NY 201 Suffolk NY 5551
Hamilton OH 4708 Sullivan NY 296
Highland OH 262 Teller CO 149
Jefferson CO 5089 Tulare CA 726
Johnston NC 392 Tuolumne CA 434
Kings CA 369 Ventura CA 5138
Kings NY 7282 Walworth WI 195
Lawrence PA 300 Warren NY 213
Lewis WA 455 Warren OH 404
Los Angeles CA 21741 Washington NY 179
Louisa VA 258 Washington PA 703
Madera CA 403 Wayne MI 6442
Madison NY 282 Westchester NY 3102
Maricopa AZ 15087 Wyoming NY 119
Marin CA 1495 Yamhill OR 412
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Table 1: Summary of health plans
1998 1999
Total # of health plans 442 362
# FFS plans 14 13
% enrollment in FFS 60.95 60.94
# HMO plans 428 349
% enrollment in HMO 12.38 12.49
# Publicly reporting plans 175 133
% enrollment in public 7.25 7.10
# Nonpublic plans 72 95
% enrollment in nonpublic 2.64 3.33
The percentages enrolled in FFS and HMO plans do
not add to one because some annuitants opt out,
choosing not to enroll in any FEHBP plan. The
percentages enrolled in public and nonpublic do not
add to the percentage enrolled in HMOs because
some plans are non-reporting (i.e., neither public nor
nonpublic).
Table 2: Summary statistics for counties: selected vs. full sample
Full Sample Selected Sample
1998 1999 1998 1999
# of counties 3180 3220 86 86
Median # annuitants per county 106 106 736 741
Mean # annuitants per county 530 523 3000 2971
Median # plans per county 6 6 11 10
Median # HMOs per county 2 2 5 5
Median # reporting plans 2 2 3 3
Median # public per county 1 1 2 2
Median max# public per county 1 1 3 3
Median # nonpublic per county 1 1 1 2
Median max# nonpublic per county 1 1 2 2
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Table 3: Summary of plan and individual characteristics (means and standard deviations)
Full sample Selected sample
Plan Characteristics:
Gross Premium ($) 83.71 85.14
(14.96) (17.89)
Office copay ($) 6.39 6.06
(3.12) (3.35)
Emergency copay ($) 38.85 34.65
(15.70) (16.53)
Prescription copay ($) 7.96 7.48
(3.74) (3.79)
Generic copay ($) 5.49 5.30
(2.21) (2.19)
Satisfaction rate (%) 57.68 56.82
(9.29) (9.00)
NCQA score -0.20 -0.08
(1.11) (1.03)









Number of individuals 3,427,163 509,139
Percent new 6.35 6.00
Percent switchers 2.10 1.74
Percent in FFS plans 82.91 65.60
Percent w/ family coverage 46.02 40.60
Percent eligible for Medicare 66.47 67.84
The table lists means with standard deviations in parentheses below. Gross premium is
biweekly; the annuitants’ share of the payment is 29%. Copay numbers are for HMO
plans only. “Generic copay” is the required copayment for generic prescriptions. The
satisfaction rate is the percentage of customers who reported being “very satisfied” or
“extremely satisfied,” as opposed to “not satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied.” Income is
annual government pension payments, and does not include outside income. The number
of individuals reflects the number who enrolled in some FEHBP plan—i.e., those that did
not opt out. “New” individuals are those whose circumstances required them to choose a
new plan (e.g. because they moved). Switchers are those who were not new (by the above
definition) and who switched plans in the corresponding year.
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Table 4: Choice patterns for switchers and new enrollees
Switchers
Prev. plan New plan Other plans
Percent FFS 64.92 60.56 56.47
Percent Public 46.85 49.26 39.85
Percent Nonpublic 32.20 28.18 27.04
Mean satisfaction rate 61.54 63.41 60.79
Mean NCQA score -0.18 0.04 -0.32
Mean previous-year market share 11.84 19.48 6.24
New enrollees
Prev. plan New plan Other plans
Percent FFS – 48.94 57.52
Percent Public – 54.03 37.88
Percent Nonpublic – 23.57 27.95
Mean satisfaction rate – 62.23 60.13
Mean NCQA score – 0.21 -0.57
Mean previous-year market share – 23.10 5.75
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Table 5: Estimates of plan choice model
I II III IV
Premium -0.0316 -0.0290 -0.0015 -0.0100
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Premium×Female -0.0136 -0.0051 -0.0003 0.0040
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0006)
Premium×Age -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Premium×Income -0.0010 0.0004 -0.0018 0.0008
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Switch — -6.6811 — -6.5029
(0.0140) (0.0141)
Switch×Female — -0.3392 — -0.3372
(0.0268) (0.0270)
Switch×Age — -0.0495 — -0.0455
(0.0011) (0.0011)
Switch×Income — 0.1360 — 0.1284
(0.0102) (0.0103)
Lag Market Share — — 6.1489 4.8167
(0.0113) (0.0351)
Satisfaction rate×FFS 0.1131 0.0829 0.0193 0.0146
(0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0014)
Satisfaction rate×HMO 0.0074 -0.0003 -0.0076 -0.0092
(0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0016)
Coverage 0.0434 0.0786 0.0006 0.0518
(0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0008) (0.0024)
Coverage×1999 -0.5171 -0.2053 0.0292 0.1593
(0.0050) (0.0160) (0.0060) (0.0180)
Public 0.1259 0.0537 -0.0487 -0.0367
(0.0153) (0.0315) (0.0147) (0.0318)
NCQA Score×Public 0.3781 0.4152 0.2900 0.3747
(0.0081) (0.0173) (0.0080) (0.0175)
NCQA Score×Nonpublic 0.0951 0.1331 0.1082 0.0828
(0.0062) (0.0132) (0.0061) (0.0135)
N 153,405 153,405 153,405 153,405
Average Log-likelihood -7.1596 -0.8331 -5.9692 -0.7664
Pseudo-R2 .1805 .9046 .3168 .9123
Standard errors in parentheses. Premium is biweekly gross premium; “Switch” is an indicator equal to
zero for the previous year’s plan, and equal to one for all others; lag market share is the plan’s market
share in the individual’s county in the previous year. “Coverage” refers to the FEHBP satisfaction rate
for the plan’s coverage of services; we estimate a separate coefficient on this variable for 1999 because
the survey question was altered between 1998-1999. Several additional controls were included in the
estimation, but to save space are not reported here. (A table listing the full set of coefficients is
available from the authors.) 34
Table 6: Medicare beneficiaries and new enrollees
Medicare Non-Medicare New enrollees Non-new enrollees
Premium -0.0152 -0.0055 -0.0048 -0.0158
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Switch -6.5554 -6.3284 — -6.5330
(0.0184) (0.0286) (0.0154)
Lag Market Share 4.4888 5.0153 5.5374 3.8004
(0.0580) (0.0443) (0.0462) (0.0572)
Satisfaction rate×FFS 0.0240 0.0092 0.0037 0.0325
(0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0021)
Satisfaction rate×HMO -0.0143 -0.0071 -0.0149 0.0004
(0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0025)
Coverage 0.0712 0.0411 0.0220 0.0924
(0.0040) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0036)
Coverage×1999 0.1117 0.1803 0.2707 0.0176
(0.0297) (0.0227) (0.0244) (0.0277)
Public -0.1182 0.0007 -0.0389 -0.0841
(0.0583) (0.0379) (0.0415) (0.0504)
NCQA Score×Public 0.3436 0.3823 0.4459 0.1995
(0.0310) (0.0212) (0.0237) (0.0282)
NCQA Score×Nonpublic 0.0871 0.0794 0.0137 0.2670
(0.0240) (0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0225)
N 74,156 79,259 31,756 121,649
Average Log-likelihood -0.6139 -0.9054 -1.9333 -0.4486
Pseudo-R2 .9495 .8362 .2397 .9567
New enrollees are annuitants whose circumstances required choosing a new health plan in the given
year—e.g., because they moved to a new county or because their previous plan was dropped from the
FEHBP. All variable definitions are the same as in Table 5. Interactions of annuitant characteristics (age,
income, sex) were included in the estimation, but the coefficients are omitted to save space. The reported
coefficients on Premium and Switch reflect effects for males with average age and income.
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Table 7: Model estimates: including interactions with reporting status
All enrollees Non-new enrollees New enrollees
Premium -0.0106 -0.0162 -0.0047
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Premium×Public -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0009
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Switch -6.5346 -6.5316 —
(0.0154) (0.0176)
Switch×Public 0.1846 -0.0529 —
(0.0347) (0.0442)
Lag Market Share 4.8392 3.7365 5.7200
(0.0403) (0.0634) (0.0545)
Lag Market Share×Public -0.1469 0.1887 -0.6188
(0.0934) (0.1656) (0.1204)
Satisfaction rate×FFS 0.0195 0.0366 0.0071
(0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0021)
Satisfaction rate×HMO -0.0041 0.0070 -0.0160
(0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0024)
Satisfaction×HMO×Public -0.0128 -0.0197 -0.0050
(0.0024) (0.0039) (0.0034)
Coverage 0.0485 0.0961 0.0110
(0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0033)
Coverage×Public 0.0063 0.0097 0.0054
(0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0017)
Coverage×1999 0.0568 -0.0704 0.1625
(0.0214) (0.0315) (0.0301)
Coverage×1999×Public 0.3073 0.4441 0.2397
(0.0466) (0.0775) (0.0616)
Public 0.3164 0.4779 0.0786
(0.1115) (0.1652) (0.1537)
NCQA Score×Public 0.3740 0.2345 0.4394
(0.0185) (0.0305) (0.0258)
NCQA Score×Nonpublic 0.0916 0.2126 0.0587
(0.0140) (0.0231) (0.0178)
N 153,405 121,649 31,756
Average Log-likelihood -0.7656 -0.4479 -1.9623
Pseudo-R2 0.9124 0.9567 0.2425
All variable definitions are the same as in Tables 5 and 6. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 8: Value of information estimates
Counterfactual
Specification Public scores withheld Nonpublic scores publicized
Old/new annuitants pooled
(Table 7, column I)
Number of choices changed 3,539 2,078
Percent of choices changed 0.69 0.41
Average value of information:
Choices changed $160.37 $218.46
Overall $1.11 $0.88
Old and new separately
(Table 7, columns II-III)
OLD:
Number of choices changed 2,240 96
Percent of choices changed 0.47 0.02
Average value of information:
Choices changed $105.45 $10.50
Overall $0.49 $0.002
NEW:
Number of choices changed 2,552 1,259
Percent of choices changed 8.04 3.97
Average value of information:
Choices changed $588.67 $644.36
Overall $47.31 $25.55
37
















−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Full Sample

















−4 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Selected counties
Public plans Nonpublic plans
38
